Abstract. In sponsored search auctions advertisers typically pay a fixed amount per click that their advertisements receive. In particular, the advertiser and the publisher enter into a contract (e.g., the publisher displays the ad; the advertiser pays the publisher 10 cents per click), and each party's subjective value for such a contract depends on their estimated click-through rates (CTR) for the ad. Starting from this motivating example, we define and analyze a class of contract auctions that generalize the classical second price auction. As an application, we introduce impression-plus-click pricing for sponsored search, in which advertisers pay a fixed amount per impression plus an additional amount if their ad is clicked. Of note, when the advertiser's estimated CTR is higher than the publisher's estimated CTR, both parties find negative click payments advantageous, where the advertiser pays the publisher a premium for the impression but the publisher then pays the advertiser per click.
Introduction
In the classical sealed-bid second-price auction, bidders report their value for the auctioned good, and the winner is the bidder with the highest reported value. Incentive compatibility is achieved by charging the winner the least amount for which they would have still won the auction (i.e., the winner pays the second highest bid). In contrast, consider a typical sponsored search auction where, for simplicity, we assume bidders compete for a single available impression: Advertisers report their value-per-click; the winner is the bidder from whom the publisher expects to receive the most revenue; and the winning bidder pays the least amount per click for which they would have still won the auction. While sponsored-search auctions are conceptually similar to traditional second price auctions, there is a key difference: Goods in traditional auctions are exchanged for deterministic payments, and in particular, the value of these payments is identical to the bidder and the auctioneer; in sponsored search auctions, impressions are exchanged for stochastic payments, and the value of such payments to the publisher and the advertiser depends on their respective estimated clickthrough rates (CTR). For example, if the advertiser's estimated CTR is higher than the publisher's, then the advertiser would expect to pay more than the publisher would expect to receive.
Starting from this motivating example of sponsored search, we define and develop a framework for contract auctions that generalize the second price auction.
We consider arbitrary agent valuations over a space of possible contracts; in particular, valuations may diverge for reasons other than mismatched probability estimates. As an application, we introduce impression-plus-click (IPC) sponsored search auctions, in which advertisers pay a fixed amount per impression and make an additional payment per click. Interestingly, when the advertiser's estimated CTR is higher than the publisher's estimate, both parties prefer negative click payments-or paid per click pricing: The advertiser pays the publisher a premium for the impression, and the publisher then pays the advertiser per click.
In the remainder of this introduction we review sponsored search auctions and related work. General contract auctions are developed in Section 2, and a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism is proposed. Impressionplus-click sponsored search auctions are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze an impression-or-click auction, and consider connections to the hybrid auction model of Goel & Munagala [4] . We conclude in Section 5 by discussing potential offline applications of this work, including applications to insurance, book publication and executive compensation. Due to space constraints we omit some proofs from this version.
Background and Related Work
Sponsored search is the practice of auctioning off ad placement next to web search results; advertisers pay the search engine when their ads are clicked. These ad auctions are responsible for the majority of the revenue of today's leading search engines [10] . Edelman et al. [3] and Varian [15] provide the standard model for sponsored search auctions and analyze its equilibrium properties (see also Lahaie et al. [11] for a survey of the literature in this area). We do not provide a description of this model here because our contract auction abstracts away from its details in order to cover pricing schemes beyond per-click or per-impression.
Harrenstein et al. [7] recently and independently developed the qualitative Vickrey auction, a mechanism similar to the general contract auction presented here. The primary differences between their work and ours concern subtleties in the bidding language, the tie-breaking rules, and the assumptions guaranteeing truthfulness. In this paper we detail our interpretation and results for contract auctions; our main contribution, however, is applying this framework to sponsored search, and in particular introducing impression-plus-click pricing.
Truthfulness under the standard model of sponsored search is well understood [1] . In mechanism design more generally, Holmstrom [8] characterizes truthful payment rules for type spaces that are smoothly path-connected (see also [12, 13] ). In contrast, our truthfulness result for contract auctions does not assume any topology on the type space. Instead it is a consequence of the particular structure of the outcome space (the auctioneer may contract with only one agent) together with a novel consistency condition between the auctioneer and agents' preferences.
Contract auctions generalize the single-item Vickrey auction [16] , but are conceptually distinct from the well-known Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism [2, 6] . An intuitive interpretation of the VCG mechanism is that it charges each agent the externality that the agent imposes on others; thus, the mechanism only applies when utility is transferable between agents through payments. This is not possible when, for instance, the agents and auctioneer disagree on click-through rates, because there can be no agreement on how to quantify the externality. There are many reasons why disagreement might arise: clicks are low probability events whose distributions are hard to model [14] , and the auctioneer and advertisers may disagree on which clicks were valid [5, 9] .
The hybrid auction of Goel and Munagala [4] is a notable departure from the basic sponsored search model in that it attempts to reconcile differing publisher and advertiser click-through estimates. In a hybrid auction advertisers place per-click bids as well as per-impression bids, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two pricing schemes. Goel and Munagala [4] show that, besides being truthful, their hybrid auction has many advantages over simple per-click keyword auctions. The auction allows advertisers to take into account their attitudes towards risk and may generate higher revenue, among other nice properties. The consistency condition given in this work distills the reason behind truthfulness in the hybrid auction, and our contract auction leads to variants and generalizations of the hybrid auction to multiple pricing schemes beyond CPC and CPM (e.g., CPA for any kind of action).
Contract Auctions
We define and develop an incentive compatible mechanism for contract auctions where agents have valuations over an arbitrary space of possible contracts. Suppose there are N agents A 1 , . . . , A N and finite sets C 1 , . . . , C N that denote the set of potential contracts each agent could enter into. Agents have valuation functions v i : C i → R for their respective contracts, and the auctioneer's value for each contract is given by v A i : C i → R. Contracts, in this setting, are nothing more than abstract objects for which each party has a value. The auctioneer is to enter into a single contract, and our goal is to design a framework to facilitate this transaction.
The valuation functions are intended to represent purely subjective utilities, based, for example, on private beliefs or simply taste. In this sense, each agent values contracts in their own "currency," which cannot directly be converted into values for other agents. We require that preferences be consistent in the following sense: Among contracts acceptable to a given bidder (i.e., those contracts for which the bidder has non-negative utility), the highest value contract to the auctioneer is one for which the bidder has zero utility. This statement is formalized by Definition 1. 
Consistency is equivalent to the following property:
We note that consistency is a weak restriction on the structure of valuations. In particular, if contracts include a "common currency" component, for which bidders and the auctioneer have an agreed upon value, then valuations are necessarily consistent.
Under this assumption of consistency, Mechanism 1 defines a dominant strategy incentive-compatible mechanism for contract auctions. First, bidders report their valuation function to the auctioneer. In the applications we consider, this entails reporting a small set of parameters which defines the valuation function over the entire contract space. Next, among contracts for which agents have non-negative utility (i.e., "acceptable" or "individually-rational" contracts), the auctioneer identifies the contract for which it has maximum value; the winner of the auction is the bidder who submitted this maximum value acceptable contract. Finally, the auctioneer and the winner enter into the best contract from the winner's perspective for which it would have still won the auction. Ai claims to have non-negative valuation, and define Ri = max
to be the maximum value the auctioneer can achieve from each agent among these purportedly acceptable contracts.
, and let
With agent A h(1) , the auctioneer enters into any contract c * such that
Theorem 1. In the setting above, suppose agents have consistent valuations. Then Mechanism 1 is dominant strategy incentive compatible.
Proof. Fix an agent A i and consider its strategy. Let R −i = max j =i R j where R j is defined as in (1) . If A i were to win the auction, then it would necessarily enter into a contract among those in the set
Then by the assumption of consistent valuations, there exists a contract c 2 such that v i (c 2 ) ≥ 0 and v
In particular, if A i truthfully reports its valuation function, then we would
, and hence A i would win the auction. Furthermore, in this case the best A i could do is to enter into a contract in the set arg max Mi v i (c). Again, truthful reporting ensures that this optimal outcome occurs. Now suppose max Mi v i (c) ≤ 0. In this case A i has no possibility of positive gain, whether or not it wins the auction. However, by reporting truthfully, if A i does win the auction the final contract would be selected from the set S i = {c ∈ C i | v i (c) ≥ 0}. That is, truthful reporting ensures that A i achieves (the optimal) zero gain.
2
We next show that the consistency condition plays a crucial role in achieving incentive compatibility by exhibiting an example with inconsistent valuations where truth telling is not a dominant strategy. Suppose the auctioneer has one item for sale and there are two agents A i and A j . Agent A i , Irene, values the item at $4 but only has $2 to spend. There are three contracts she can enter into, c ) = x for any x ∈ {1, 2, 3}. If the agents report their valuations truthfully, then R i = R j = 2 and the auctioneer must break the tie. Unless the tie is broken deterministically in favor of Irene, she has an incentive to lie. Suppose she reports her valuation for c i 3 to be 1, pretending that she has enough money to afford the item. In that case R i = 3, and R j = 2, so Irene wins the item; but she can select any outcome so long as the auctioneer's utility is at least R j = 2. She chooses c i Remark 1. In the above we have assumed the contract spaces C i are finite. This restriction is imposed only to ensure the maximum operation is well-defined in Mechanism 1. We implicitly relax this condition in the following discussion, as it is clear the relevant maxima exist despite having infinite contract spaces.
Mechanism 1 generalizes the usual sealed-bid second-price auction. To see this, take C i = R, and let the contract p ∈ R indicate agent A i 's obligation to purchase the auctioned good at price p. If agent A i values the good at w i , then its value over contracts is given by v i (p) = w i − p, and in particular, its preferences over contracts is parametrized by w i ∈ R. The auctioneer has valuation v A i (p) = p. Now, lettingw i be A i 's reported valuation, we have R i =w i . Furthermore,
and so arg max Sṽh(1) =w h(2) . That is, agent A h(1) enters into the contract w h(2) , agreeing to pay the second highest bid for the good.
The Impression-Plus-Click Pricing Model
We now consider a specific application of contract auctions for sponsored search: impression-plus-click pricing. For a given impression, define a contract (r s , r f ) ∈ R 2 to require the advertiser pay r s if a click occurs and r f if no click occurs. This is a complete pricing scheme if the advertiser values only impressions and clicks. We note that so-called "brand advertisers" often have significant utility for simply displaying their ads, regardless of whether or not their ads are clicked. These contracts are equivalently parametrized by (r m , r c ) ∈ R 2 , where the advertiser pays r m per impression and an additional r c per click. Using this latter, additive, notation, an impression-plus-click (IPC) contract is represented as a point in the CPM-CPC price plane. A priori there are no restrictions on these contracts (e.g., one or both coordinates could be negative).
Contract Preferences
where
We suppose the advertiser requires limited liability in the following sense. For advertiser specific constants CPM i > 0 and CPC i > 0, we assume the advertiser has strictly negative utility for any contract (r m , r c ) with either r m > CPM i or r c > CPC i ; aside from this caveat, the advertiser is risk-neutral. In other words, advertisers effectively have a maximum amount they are willing to spend on clicks and impressions, but otherwise they are risk neutral.
The utility function of each advertiser A i can be derived from four numbers: its value-per-click w i , its estimated CTR p i , and its price caps CPM i and CPC i . Equivalently, A i 's utility function is determined by the two contracts 
From the (risk-neutral) publisher's perspective, the utility of a contract (r m , r c ) entered into with advertiser A i is 
Designing the Impression-Plus-Click Auction
Given the advertiser and publisher preferences outlined in Section 3.1, we next apply Theorem 1 to design a dominant strategy incentive compatible IPC auction for sponsored search. We start with two preliminary lemmas. 
Proof. The level curve L 0 on which the advertiser has (true) zero utility is given by the line segment
and the set S i on which the advertiser has non-negative utility is given by the points below L 0 : 
For (r m , r c ) ∈ T , andw i indicating A i 's inferred value per click, we havẽ
The result now follows by noting that (4) 
Together with Lemmas 1 and 2, the general contract auction of Mechanism 1 leads to the impression-plus-click auction described by Mechanism 2. First, each advertiser submits two contracts-ostensibly specifying its entire utility function. The publisher then computes its own utility for each of these 2N contracts, and the winner of the auction is the agent who submitted the contract with the highest value to the publisher. The "second-highest value" is the value of the best contract (again from the publisher's perspective) among those submitted by the losing bidders. To determine the actual contract entered into, we consider two cases. If the highest value contract has higher CPM than the winner's other bid, then the final contract is determined by decreasing the CPC on the highest value contract until the publisher's value for that contract is equal to the second highest value. Analogously, if the highest value contract has lower CPM than the winner's other bid, the final contract is determined by decreasing the CPM of the highest value contract. 
3: Fix h so that
The publisher enters into a contract with agent A h(1) . The final contract c * is determined as follows: , where the inequalities hold coordinatewise. 2. The mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible. That is, it is a dominant strategy for each advertiser A i to truthfully report
.
The Impression-or-Click Pricing Model
With impression-plus-click pricing, advertisers pay publishers for each impression, and then pay an additional amount if their ad is clicked. The hybrid sponsored search auction of Goel & Munagala [4] can be thought of as impressionor-click (IOC) pricing. That is, the final selected contract is guaranteed to be either pure per-impression or pure per-click, but it is not known which it will be until all bids have been submitted. The hybrid auction, as shown below, is equivalent to a special case of the general contract auction with the contract spaces restricted to the axes of the CPM-CPC plane:
Suppose both advertisers and publishers are risk neutral. As before, let p i denote advertiser A i 's subjective click-through rate, let p A i denote the publisher's estimated click-through rate for an impression awarded to A i , and let w i denote A i 's value for a click. Then A i has zero utility for the two contracts (p i w i , 0) and (0, w i ). By the assumption of risk neutrality, these two contracts completely determine A i 's preferences over all contracts. Hence, A i can communicate its preferences by reporting the two numbers CPM i = p i w i and CPC i = w i , corresponding to the maximum it is willing to pay for a per-impression and a per-click contract, respectively. The resulting IOC auction is outlined in Mechanism 3. Details of its derivation are straightforward and are omitted for space constraints. 
. Then the publisher enters into a contract with agent A h(1) . The final contract c * is determined as follows:
Although the hybrid and general contract auctions are equivalent when advertiser preferences are restricted to the CPM-CPC axis, they may lead to different outcomes when preferences are defined over the entire plane. Consider the IPC auction setting of Section 3, where we now assume that CPC i = w i and CPM i = w i p i . That is, the most advertiser A i is willing to pay per click or per impression is, respectively, its true per click value w i and its true per impression value w i p i . In particular, A i will not pay more than w i per click even if it is compensated via negative per-impression payments. In this case, the two extremal contracts that define A i 's utility function over the CPM-CPC plane are (CPM i , 0) and (0, CPC i ). With such a preference profile, we show that advertisers prefer the IPC auction over the IOC auction, and publishers are ambivalent between the two.
In both the IOC and IPC auctions, it is a dominant strategy to truthfully reveal ones' preferences: In the IOC auction advertisers report their maximum per-impression and per-click payments CPM i and CPC i ; in the IPC auction they report their pair of extremal contracts {(CPM i , 0), (0, CPC i )}. From the publisher's perspective, for each agent A i , R i is the same in both auctions. Consequently, the winner of the auction is the same under either mechanism, and moreover, the expected (subjective) revenue R * of the publisher is also the same. The publisher is thus ambivalent between the IOC and IPC auction designs.
From the advertisers' view, however, the situation is quite different. Specifically, let c * IPC and c * IOC denote the final contract entered into by the winner A h(1) under each mechanism. Then
That is, the IPC contract is optimized over the entire plane, whereas the IOC contract is optimized only over the axes. In particular, The distinction between the IPC and IOC settlement mechanisms is illustrated in Figure 1(b) . When p A h(1) < p h(1) , the publisher prefers (under both mechanisms) the winning advertiser's pure per-impression bid CPM h(1) over its pure per-click bid CPC h (1) . In this case, the final IOC contract is a pure perimpression contract, where the per-impression payment is reduced from CPM h (1) to an amount such that the ultimate value of the contract to the publisher is R * . In contrast, the final IPC contract has the advertiser still paying CPM h(1) per impression, but a "discount" is given to the advertiser via negative click payments (i.e., the publisher pays the advertiser for each click). This negative click payment is calculated so that the final value of the contract to the publisher is again R * . The final contract in either auction lies on the R * level curve of the publisher: In the IOC auction, the pure-impression contract CPM h(1) is moved left along the CPM axis until hitting this level curve; in the IPC auction, the final contract is arrived at by moving the pure-impression contract down parallel to the CPC axis.
Discussion
General contract auctions facilitate transactions when parties have conflicting information, or when they simply have different inherent value for the specific terms of a contract. Such a situation is common in traditional business negotiations, and, at least implicitly, contracts in the offline world often balance the same tradeoffs encapsulated explicitly by impression-plus-click auctions. For example, with book publication, authors typically receive a one-time advance plus royalty fees (i.e., a percentage of total sales revenue). Thus, authors confident in the future success of their book should be willing to trade a smaller advance for larger royalties. A similar tradeoff occurs with insurance premiums and deductibles: A driver who thinks he is unlikely to get into an accident should be willing to accept relatively high deductibles in exchange for relatively low premiums. Corporate executives face a similar situation when deciding between guaranteed salaries and performance-based bonuses. More generally, in instances where parties bargain between deterministic and stochastic payments, a design similar to the impression-plus-click auction may prove useful.
